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Today I want to share with you some thoughts on a subject about which 
many of  us avoid prolonged reflection. We may avoid it because we think 
there is little to discuss or because prolonged reflection on the topic can 
produce ambivalence and discomfort. I would like to consider the relation- 
ship between the study of  social conditions and efforts to improve them. In 
short, my topic is what James Rule (1978) called the relationship between 
"insight and social betterment." 
The fundamental question is whether (or even if) a better understand- 
ing of social and community life actually can bring about improved social 
conditions. A second question is how does one go about translating social 
insights derived from research and scholarship into improved conditions for 
families, organizations, and communities? I personally am a skeptical op- 
timist on this point. I am hopeful but do not take for granted the proposi- 
tion that understanding and social betterment are automatically linked. 
As I talk to my colleagues in academia and observe the workings of  
government, two somewhat disturbing portraits emerge. In government cir- 
cles 20 years ago it seemed to be almost an article of  blind faith that the 
government needed social science advice to improve social conditions. Since 
then a skepticism and even cynicism has emerged about the value of  social 
science knowledge in conducting government affairs. But in both eras it has 
been my experience that government officials are as likely to select research 
to meet political needs as they are to use research findings to evaluate a 
problem or plan a program of  social improvement. 
Unfortunately, we in academia are little better. Many of us insist that 
our understanding of the relationship between social science knowledge and 
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improvement in society can only be illuminated by certain kinds of theoreti- 
cal analyses. These analyses usually involve the uncritical use of  certain as- 
sumptions about who is to be improved, and how. These analyses call for 
simple but appealing solutions to complex problems of  an afflicted or op- 
pressed group. These are important goals, but usually the means for accom- 
plishing them are specified only in the vaguest terms. Many of  us trained 
in scientific skepticism and thoughtfulness suddenly become uncritical when 
offered a doctrine that promises much, analyzes little, and provides even less 
concrete evidence of  its plausibility. These doctrines usually have a catchy 
name and they seem to come and go every 5 years or so. 
These tendencies that I have just described are far from satisfactory 
and leave me feeling deeply uneasy. Surely we can do better than this. Perhaps 
we can benefit from two kinds of  effort.  First, we need a close and critical 
analysis of  the underlying assumptions of social thinkers who have consi- 
dered the question of  the relationship between knowledge and betterment. 
Second, we need to attempt some self-criticism and examine our own past 
experiences in relation to this question. 
MODELS OF RELEVANCE 
Let me begin by describing some underlying "models of relevance" or 
paradigms describing the relationship between social understanding and the 
improvement of  community life (Rule, 1978). By examining these models, 
making explicit their underlying assumptions, and probing their weaknesses 
we may find one that is personally satisfactory. If none are satisfactory we 
may still ask what ideas and assumptions we can use to guide our actions 
as scientists or advocates or both. 
At one level of analysis these alternative models are actually models 
of how society works as it attempts to transform social science knowledge 
into improved social conditions. That is, these models present an organized 
set of  assumptions about where social science knowledge should come from, 
how it should be used in the interest of social change, and who the 
beneficiaries of  knowledge and change should be. At another level of  analy- 
sis however, each of these models also offers a role prescription for us as 
social scientists3 I return to this last point in a moment. 
Model 1: Social Science Knowledge Has No Relevance to Social Betterment 
I include this model (or perhaps more correctly this assertion) primari- 
ly for the purposes of  logical completeness. I strongly suspect that few of 
3I am grateful to Tom D'Aunno  for the insight about  the role prescriptions implicit in societal 
models of  relevance and for his thoughtful  comments  on an earlier draft of  this paper. 
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us would have entered our field if we truly believed this to be so. Although 
I once heard a social scientist friend o f  mine say, "I study revolutions be- 
cause they have such interesting structures," most of  us have a rouch more 
instrumental orientation to the relationship between knowledge and social 
improvement and we do not see it as problematic. 
Banfield and Wilson in their book City Politics (1963) made a sophisti- 
cated argument against the relevance of  social science knowledge to social 
improvement. They argued that knowledge cannot play a real role in the so- 
lution of social problems because what holds us back is that we are really 
dealing with disagreements among interested parties, not a lack of knowledge. 
Banfield and Wilson summarized their argument by saying, "Thinking that 
a general increase in the level of knowledge (about politics) will promote better 
and faster solutions of social problems is something like thinking that a gener- 
al increase in the skill of  chess players will lead to shorter games or to 'solu- 
tion to the~problems of  chess'" (p. 3). In other words, in this skeptical view, 
the contending actors may be able to deploy social science knowledge in the 
service of their interests, but the game may result in a stalemate. 
Rule (1978) observed that this model is a difficult one to defend partly 
because social science must play at least a small role in the way contending 
social actors view the world and therefore must be influential in some way. 
Some view the no-effect model as politically conservative, but I see it as es- 
sentially skeptical. It does not argue that we should preserve things as they 
are (the classic conservative view) but that in the long run, contending par- 
ties in society will use their knowledge in what amounts to a zero-sum game 
rather than as a key to unlock the mystery of  a social problem. 
Model 2: Direct Relevance o f  Knowledge to Well-Being: 
Social Problem Solving as Rational, Incremental, Piecemeal 
A second model (or actually family of  models) has been proposed by 
social theorists and philosophers in a variety of forms (Rule, 1978). The most 
familiar names include Robert Merton (Merton & Nisbett, 1971) and Karl 
Popper (1963). This model sees the insights gleaned from our research and 
theory as being directly applicable to social problems and leading to social 
improvement. For example, Merton began by arguing that it ought to be 
possible to identify social problems or difficulties in social relations that it 
would be in everyone's interest to solve. Presumably Merton believed there 
are core conditions such as violent crime, poverty, or epidemics where social 
betterment would come about if solutions to these problems could be identi- 
fied. Merton believed that problems of this sort represent a major discrepancy 
between agreed upon social standards and actual conditions of social life. 
This definition of  social problems assumes that a single unified underlying 
set of  values exists in our society (or for that matter in any society) and that 
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a value consensus can allow us to develop shared social standards about what 
actually constitutes a problem and how to solve it. 
It is certainly true that such a list of social conditions could be devel- 
oped. However, the meaning of the social problem, its significance, and what 
would be an improvement are matters where agreement is very difficult (Rule, 
1978). If the last 8 years of our current administration has taught us noth- 
ing else it has certainly taught us that. Very different views of  how to im- 
prove education, for example, can be found by reading the writings of  John 
Dewey on the one hand or William Bennett on the other. 
Merton's model compared society to an organism or a machine and sees 
the solution of social problems in terms of functional analysis. Our job as 
social scientists according to this view, is to make technical adjustments in 
the social system. But this prescription for technical change in the organism 
or machine of  society fails to contend effectively with the problem of con- 
sensus about the nature of  social problems, and indeed what constitutes an 
agreed upon course of action for doing something about the problem. 
Merton also did not explicitly identify who the beneficiaries or con- 
sumers of  the social insight should be. However, other versions of this model 
have suggested that the government or the state should be the beneficiary 
of social science knowledge. Periodically this has been the argument of  well- 
known social scientists who have also been actors in the political arena. And 
it is not difficult to find pronouncements by National Institutes of Health 
or the National Science Foundation that make a similar plea. The underly- 
ing notion here is that it is the agencies of  the state who should receive our 
social knowledge and engage in enlightened action. This of  course makes 
the critical assumption that our government or the state in general is com- 
mitted to the eradication of  offending social conditions. A look at our safe- 
ty standards at work or the pollution of air and water might suggest the 
counterargument that government action (or inaction) has produced these 
results rather than having a commitment to eradicating them. 
A third aspect of this model that deserves at least a brief discussion 
is the implicit political tone of  the piecemeal social engineering orientation. 
Advocates of  this point of view such as Popper (1963) were made very un- 
easy by more ideological orientations to change. They expressed a strong 
discomfort with sweeping indictments of our current social system and to fun- 
damental propositions for social change. They viewed this kind of  thinking 
as "ideological" and, therefore, doctrinaire and closed minded. Instead Popper 
argued for what he called piecemeal social engineering. It is the most ration- 
al approach from his point of  view both because he believed that we do not 
yet understand enough for large-scale sweeping reform and because such 
large-scale efforts are impossible to evaluate in terms of success or failure. 
Weick (1984) has made a more elaborate argument of  the same kind, argu- 
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ing for "small wins," noting their workability, the momentum they gener- 
ate, and that they are attractive because they do not challenge basic value 
positions. 
In any case, Popper and his more modern counterparts warned against 
sweeping utopian plans and instead argued for the elimination of concrete 
problems. Unfortunately Popper's and Merton's analyses leave ambiguous 
the question of  what concrete problems can be agreed upon. 
Model 3: Conflicting Interests and Special Constituencies 
A third family of models of  the relationship between social knowledge 
and social improvement has also enjoyed widespread popularity among so- 
cial thinkers. This approach accepts from the beginning the idea that what 
we call social problems are actually the result of  conflicts between contend- 
ing interests in society. It argues that we as social scientists should take sides 
and identify special constituencies within society who would best benefit from 
whatever social insights we may generate. This model shares the assumption 
of contending parties in society with Model 1 but draws more optimistic con- 
clusions. Instead of  viewing the glass as half empty, and assuming that a 
stalemate will occur, this model views the glass as half full, that some social 
improvement can occur from taking sides. 
Of course the most famous proponent of this view was Karl Marx (Marx 
& Engels, 1959). For Marx the special constituency to benefit from his so- 
cial insights was the proletariat. He believed that he (and by extension we 
as social scientists) should explicitly identify ourselves with a particular set 
of  interests in society. In other words, our job is to communicate insights 
about the workings of the social world to this constituency. Marx believed 
ultimately that the proletariat would be free of the coercion of  a capitalist 
state. The program for accomplishing this goal was nothing less than revo- 
lution and he believed reform measures could only slow the process of in- 
evitable revolution and, therefore, were to be avoided. 
More recently this constituency-oriented model as well articulated by 
Marx has been expanded to identify new consumers of  social insight who 
are potentially special beneficiaries but who have not been compromised by 
the entrenched power structure. Beginning in the 1960s and even earlier, so- 
ciologists and other social thinkers identified a number of  groups who are 
disadvantaged in society. They included racial minorities, the poor, and so- 
cially stigmatized groups that can represent special constituencies for the in- 
sights of  social scientists. Unlike Marx, this most recent version of  Model 
3 does not argue that it is critical social insights that fuel social change. In- 
stead, it is argued that it is our job as social scientists to dramatize the dis- 
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crepancies between what society asserts as its social values and our actual 
practices with these groups. This is clearly an activist approach but one which, 
as Rule (1978) observed, does not guarantee that these discrepancies por- 
trayed will be sympathetically received by most people. Furthermore, this 
view does not specify how the consumers of these insights can act effectively 
to produce social change. 
C. Wright Mills (1959) offered a similar prescription, arguing that as 
social scientists it was our job to hold those in power responsible for their 
decisions. We should educate those who are unaware of  the consequences 
of those decisions and communicate our insight we have about the ways in 
which, to quote Mills, "personal troubles of the individual are actually con- 
nected with larger public issues" (p. 186). Although I am sympathetic with 
Mills' prescription, there remains fundamental ambiguity about who precisely 
our audience should be and what standards we should use to judge those 
in power. 
Furthermore, this view does not acknowledge the complexity of  issues 
we face or our incapacity to predict the long-range impact of  short-range 
actions. A truly ecological appreciation of complexity acknowledges unex- 
pected outcomes of apparently sensible short-term solutions. Cheap fossil 
fuel promised a better life for us and produced acid rain and the depletion 
of  the ozone layer as by-products. Closer to home, few anticipated that those 
of  us advocating for deinstitutionalization would be faced with the current 
problems of the homeless in our communities (Price & Smith, 1983). 
ROLE IMAGERY 
As I mentioned earlier, each of  these models is not only a model of  
how society could or should work as it transforms social knowledge into im- 
proved conditions of  community life, it also prescribes a role for us as com- 
munity psychologists. That is, each model speaks to us rather directly about 
how we should think about ourselves and how we should conduct our work. 
It is worthwhile taking a look at this role imagery because I believe that 
whether we are aware of it or not, we think of ourselves through one of these 
lenses, or perhaps feel torn and conflicted because we find ourselves simul- 
taneously attracted and repelled by some aspects of  the role imagery implied 
by each of these models. 
The first model, which postulates that there is no relationship between 
social understanding and improvement in human affairs, calls up the image 
of a detached and even disinterested scholar, someone interested in knowledge 
for its own sake. This is laudable enough, but indicates little concern for 
the plight of  others in the world. I strongly suspect that there are a few in 
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this room who feel comfortable  with that image, or even can identify with 
it very much. 
The second model calls up role imagery that is familiar to all of  us. 
A model that sees direct links between gains in social understanding and im- 
provements in human well-being is one that sees the social scientist as a seeker 
of  truth, someone eager to uncover the facts, or someone who wants to un- 
lock the social puzzle. This role also offers us a clear idea of how to get the 
knowledge we need. The image usually involves the construction of  an 
elaborate research or evaluation design. Perhaps the quintessential example 
of  this role model is Don Campbell,  someone many of us greatly admire. 
Model 3 also offers role imagery that is familiar to all of  us. Here the 
social scientist is a seeker of  justice and an attacker of  oppression. Invaria- 
bly, social scientists acting in this role have a clear idea of  who the victim 
is and who the oppressor is. The methodology is also well known and calls 
up a vision of  liberation of  the oppressed through struggle and an oppressor 
vanquished. Perhaps the best example of  this role model is Saul Alinsky, 
also someone many of us greatly admire. 
SOCIAL PROBLEMS OR SOCIAL CONFLICT?  
It was Seymour Sarason (1978) who pointed out to many of us that 
social problems are unlike arithmetic problems. They simply could not be 
solved in a straightforward way. In his many writings he has offered alter- 
native visions of  how we could cope with the dilemmas of  community.  The 
anarchist 's insight, the networks of  Mrs. Dewer, and still other visions of  
social t ransformation have become part  of  our legacy. I f  social problems 
are not like arithmetic problems, then what are they like? 
Is there an alternative conception of  social problems and what is its 
implication for action? Rule (1978) has argued that attempts at rational tech- 
nocratic social problem solving may actually disguise social conflict and com- 
peting efforts to control desirable resources in society. According to this view 
we do not have a "racial problem."  Instead what we call racial problems are 
actually symptoms of  conflict between supporters and opponents of  more 
opportunity in society for blacks. Similarly, we do not have an "unemploy- 
ment problem."  Instead we have workers who have become too old or too 
expensive, which has led corporate owners to close plants and to hire young- 
er, cheaper workers elsewhere. 
This view of social problems argues that there is no definition of  a so- 
cial problem that is devoid of  political judgments and parties in conflict. And 
there are no solutions to such problems without conflict among social ac- 
tors. This view of  social problems counsels us not to look for a "fix" of  the 
problem but instead to identify the contestants and to take sides. 
158 Price 
O U R  A M B I V A L E N C E  
I f  you have stayed with me through this long exegesis so far you may 
have felt more than a small twinge of ambivalence. The very reason for the 
existence of  our discipline is, in one way or another, to try to link whatever 
insights we can f rom our scientific work to an improvement  in community 
life. And yet each of  the dominant models of  relevance have both appealing 
features and substantial flaws. Most of  us would not be in our current work 
if we accepted the Model 1 assertion that there is no certain connection be- 
tween social insight and the improvement  of  social conditions. Many of  us 
have argued for a version of the Model 2 social problem solving model, recog- 
nizing uncomfortably that it is piecemeal, incremental, and begs questions 
about  the nature of  social problems and the possibility of  value consensus 
about  them. Many of  us find too much that is appealing in Model 3 and 
like to imagine that our scholarly endeavors are aimed at a special consti- 
tuency such as the poor,  the disadvantaged, and the oppressed. At the same 
time, we may have grave doubts about whether our intellectual efforts can 
have direct or even indirect benefits for these constituencies. 
I believe these are hard questions we must face. To retreat into mind- 
less social engineering or revolutionary rhetoric provides no sound basis for 
our discipline. Let me turn to what I think are some partial solutions for 
me at least. One has to do with a rethinking of the meaning of  social problems 
and the other has to do with lessons learned f rom two of my own modest 
attempts to link some modest social insights to social betterment. These sto- 
ries are in the confessional mode because I believe that a self-critical exami- 
nation of our own attempts can help to move us to our own personal model 
of  the relationship between understanding and community well-being. 
TWO PROJECTS 
I want to tell you about  two projects in which I was recently involved, 
because they made me question my own role as a social scientist, its mean- 
ing, and how I should proceed. They helped me gain a few glimmers of  in- 
sight about how we might conduct ourselves if we believe that there is, and 
should be, a link between knowledge and social betterment. I learned things 
I did not expect to learn f rom these experiences. They each left me still am- 
bivalent about  the Campbell  versus Alinsky alternatives, but perhaps feel- 
ing a little better about  my ambivalence. 
The first project began several years ago and was a joint effort.  Emory  
Cowen, Ray Lorion, Julia Ramos-McKay, as well as Beverly Hitchins of  the 
American Psychological Association, were hard-working and valued col- 
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leagues in this effort. The American Psychological Association had appointed 
us to a task force on prevention. Our idea was to once and for all demon- 
strate to the public that there were prevention efforts that really worked. 
In my mind, this would provide a concrete response to the skepticism of some 
of  our scientific colleagues. It would also be a response to the forces of  the 
treatment lobby, whose entrenched interests meant there was little time or 
energy left for prevention. And finally, it would be a response to those who 
argued that prevention was just another way of  deflecting our energies from 
liberating the oppressed. The story of how we were able to identify both those 
few prevention programs among the hundreds that we considered has been 
told elsewhere (Price, Cowen, Lorion, & Ramos-McKay, 1988). 
What I learned from this project is not irrelevant to those models of 
relevance and scientific roles I have just discussed. I started out thinking our 
goal was largely a technical one, and that effective prevention programs could 
be evaluated primarily on empirical grounds. I ended up learning that preven- 
tion programs that were really effective took sides. That is, they managed 
to become an advocate for the population with which they were concerned. 
They communicated that sense of  advocacy by offering a better alternative 
to the existing social institution in question, whether it was a high school, 
an obstetrics ward, or the juvenile court. And their designers were social ad- 
vocates who insisted that high schools could be settings where students and 
teachers cared for each other and where dropping out might be seen as a 
failure of  the school, not of  the student. They were advocates who knew 
how to create circumstances where a couple could have their child in a set- 
ting where caring was available as well as medical technology. These advo- 
cates and designers believed that advocacy and companionship for kids in 
the juvenile justice system was a better alternative than legal processing and 
neg lec t - and  they were right. So effective prevention programs actually 
offered a critique of  the existing social system or organization and offered 
an alternative social form (Reinharz, 1984) that offered both advocacy and 
support for kids in trouble or poor black preschoolers, or widows. 4 
I started out thinking that our efforts at seeking and describing effec- 
tive preventive efforts would speak for themselves. I ended up bearing wit- 
ness for their value in a lot of  ways that I did not expect to, and which were 
certainly not part of the usual professional role, including doing radio shows, 
writing in "popular" magazines, and testifying in front of Congress. This 
last experience brought home especially to me the realization that we were 
dealing in the political arena rather than with the social engineers design shop. 
My colleagues and I were testifying before the House Select Committee on 
4I thank Ken Heller for his suggestion that preventive programs have these critical qualities 
and that they can offer alternatives to status quo social arrangements. 
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Children, Youth, and Families (Price, 1984, 1987). We bore witness to new 
possibilities for reducing the impact of marital separation, for reducing child 
abuse, and improving adolescent health and reducing pregnancy. The parti- 
san response from some members of the Select Committee was that these 
were measures that would undermine the institution of the marriage and fam- 
ily and promote the teaching of sexual immorality in the schools. 
I started out thinking that it would be easy to find lots of examples 
of effective programs. We ended up having to tell the truth. There are still 
so few that we must redouble our efforts. Nine hundred initial inquiries 
produced 300 responses, but only 14 programs that we could recommend 
as exemplary. And many promising efforts will never be able to provide hard 
evidence of effectiveness. It is just too expensive, too complex, and the 
knowledge and skills to assemble the evidence are not there. 
Another project brought home some similar lessons and, again, made 
me wonder about my role as social scientist and advocate. For several years, 
my colleagues Ron Kessler, Jim House, Bob Caplan, and Amiram Vinokur 
at the Michigan Prevention Research Center and I have been studying the 
problem of unemployment and its impact on peoples' psychological and phys- 
ical well-being (Kessler, House, & Turner, 1987; Caplan, Vinokur, Price, 
& van Ryn, 1988). We have also been developing programs that would help 
people get back into the labor market and continue with their lives with 
reasonable incomes and adequate security for the future. 
One day I got a call from a law firm. They were representing a group 
of people who had been the victims of a plant closing and they wanted to 
know whether I would say something in court about what we had learned 
about the impact of unemployment. I said yes, and what has happened in 
the last year has again led me to reconsider my role as social scientist or ad- 
vocate. 
The plant that had closed belonged to a large manufacturing firm in 
the Midwest. Apparently, management had concluded that the company had 
excess capacity and had to make a decision about which plant to close. The 
plant they chose to close employed primarily older workers. In fact, the aver- 
age length of time until retirement was only 3 years. The plant they kept open 
consisted primarily of younger workers, receiving low pay and with pension 
benefits due to them only in the distant future. Eighteen of the older work- 
ers from the plant that had closed sued the company for age discrimination, 
and they won. A second hearing was scheduled to assess the damages, both 
financial, in terms of lost pay and pensions, and psychological damage, in 
terms of anxiety, depression, and insecurity. 
In order to learn more about the case, I interviewed each of the work- 
ers in the case and many of their wives. I thought I was just going to collect 
data, but after the first few interviews, I found myself deeply shaken by the 
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sense of betrayal, the fear and hopelessness, the financial hardship, and deep 
sense of  insecurity about  the future that I saw in these people. There were 
a lot of  tears and a lot o f  agony in those interviews, and I confess to having 
been deeply moved and changed by the experience. 
Again, I learned a great deal. I started out thinking that I was going 
to be an expert witness, and I ended up feeling the need to take sides, to 
describe both the findings of  our research and the concrete reality of  the agony 
and fear that these people were experiencing. I started out thinking the data 
would speak for themselves, and ended up on the witness stand feeling as 
I had never felt before, that there was a concrete connection between what 
we had learned in our research and interviews and the chance of  justice and 
social betterment for these workers and their families. I started out thinking 
that the truth consists primarily of  what we had found in our surveys, and 
ended up discovering that the concrete facts of  these peoples' lives felt a great 
deal truer than the abstractions that summarized our research results. 
TAKING SIDES, BEARING WITNESS,  AND T E L L I N G  T H E  T R U T H  
So what are the lessons f rom these two projects, and where does it leave 
us in trying to create a more coherent model connecting social knowledge 
and community well-being? I can only offer my own conclusions, ones that 
feel right to me now. Whatever model eventually emerges for me will have 
embodied in it somehow three impulses to action. They are (a) take sides, 
(b) bear witness, (c) tell the truth. These are not meant to be simplistic in- 
junctions because each of  them triggers a dialectic that must be played out, 
since there are potential costs and potential victims to be concerned about. 
Taking Sides 
These experiences have convinced me that we cannot avoid taking sides 
in our work. A view of social problems that imagines social actors in con- 
flict rather than social puzzles to solve is one that requires that the engaged 
social scientist take sides. As Robert  Kahn (1987) observed, it may not be 
so much of whether we empower others, but whom we empower. 5 Rather than 
avoid the issue, and fail to do the analysis that identifies the actors in con- 
flict, the beneficiaries, and the victims, we can begin by admitting that we 
must be partisans. To admit it is a liberating act, but we must each for our- 
selves find what we regard to be the most urgent cause. We must also make 
5Robert Kahn first made this insightful observation, and I only later realized its importance. 
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a candid admission of  our role as advocates. To be candid requires some 
courage, but it is a major  antidote to ambivalence. 
There will be times when what we have to say will help to redefine ap- 
parently conflicting interests in ways that will allow resolutions that have 
the now familiar "win-win" quality. In those cases we will be fortunate to 
be able to point out that, in the long run, contesting parties share a tran- 
scendent common interest that makes short-term conflict less necessary or 
desirable. But there will be other instances in which no such long-term com- 
mon  interest or interdependency can be found, and in those cases, having 
taken sides, we will have to bear witness in a partisan fashion. 
But to take sides involves other risks to be calculated. To take sides 
with one contending faction will probably mean never to have credibility with 
the other. We will not be able to use the cloak of ambiguity, which at times 
can be so useful in negotiating organization and community life as March 
and Olsen (1976) and Weick (1979) have observed. 
Bearing Witness 
We have available to us a wide range of arenas for action in addition 
to scholarly publication. We should not be afraid to use them. Their very 
use sometimes violates explicit or implicit professional norms about the proper 
way to communicate one's insights, but I believe an engaged social scientist 
can do nothing else. It might be argued that we are acting most responsibly 
when we communicate in ways most likely to be heard, even if it involves 
a "popular" magazine article, whistle blowing, a radio program, a commu- 
nity forum, or the witness stand. We must be heard to make any difference. 
On the other hand, to be "unprofessional" in this way means violating norms 
that many of  our colleagues do not take lightly. We will be accused of  grand- 
standing, selling out, or engaging in "pop" activities, nothing a serious so- 
cial scientist would ever do. 
Telling the Truth 
Finally, as obvious as it may sound, we must tell the truth. This is a 
more subtle and demanding thing than we might first imagine. Truth-telling 
can come in many forms. Many theories of  social life contain empirical propo- 
sitions that yield to hard-headed social research and analysis (HeUer, Price, 
Reinharz, Riger, & Wandersman,  1984; D 'Aunno and Price, 1984a, 1984b). 
That is one kind of  truth to tell. Telling the truth about what we do not know 
as well as what we do is another way of telling the truth. Hardest  of  all, 
we may have to tell the truth about those for whom we advocate. Even vic- 
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tims have secrets, and we must weigh the cost o f  telling the whole truth about 
those for w h o m  we advocate. 
Even telling the truth is not so simple. Sissela Bok (1979) has shown 
us that telling the truth is itself a moral choice which can sometimes produce 
unexpected harm to others. What about confidentiality? What about fideli- 
ty to community groups, clients, colleagues? And what about simple respect? 
Thus, even the simple injunction to tell the truth sets o f f  a dialectic that one 
must see to its conclusion. 
These are modest conclusions,  not yet a fourth paradigm for the trans- 
formation of  social insight into community betterment. They are conclusions 
that are hard to live by. But I believe we have no other choice. 
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